We characterize epistemic consequences of truthful communication among rational agents in a game-theoretic setting. To this end we introduce normal-form games equipped with an interaction structure, which specifies which groups of players can communicate their preferences with each other. We then focus on a specific form of interaction, namely a distributed form of iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies (IESDS), driven by communication among the agents. We study the outcome of IESDS after some (possibly all) messages about players' preferences have been sent. The main result of the paper, Theorem 4, provides an epistemic justification of this form of IESDS.
Introduction

Motivation and framework
One of the main topics in the area of multiagent reasoning is study of epistemic reasoning of communicating agents in a distributed setting, see, e.g., [15, 12] . Game theory focuses on interaction between different types of agents, namely rational agents, whose objective is to maximize their utility.
Our interest is to analyze epistemic reasoning of agents who exhibit both characteristics, i.e. who communicate and are rational. We assume that such agents are involved in distributed decision making, by which we mean an interactive process during which agents repeatedly combine their local information with new information obtained through communication with other agents in order to arrive at a (possibly common) conclusion by means of a deductive process.
To make such a general study meaningful we focus on a specific instance of distributed decision making, namely iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies (IESDS) [18] driven by the acquisition of new information through communication. In our setup each agent repeatedly combines local information about his preference among his strategies with new information acquired through interaction with other agents. This allows each agent to increasingly eliminate more strategies. We are interested in characterizing knowledge of each agent at the end of this decision making process.
To formalize this setting we introduce a game-theoretic framework which combines locality and interaction. We assume a setting of imperfect information in which the players' preferences are not commonly known. Instead, the initial information of each player only covers his own preferences, and the players can truthfully communicate this information in the fixed groups to which they belong. So locality refers to the information about preferences and interaction refers to communication within (possibly overlapping) groups of players.
To realize this framework we augment a normal-form game with an interaction structure of [3] that consists of (possibly overlapping) groups of players within which synchronous communication is possible.
More precisely, we make the following assumptions:
-the players initially know the interaction structure and their own preferences, -they are rational, in the sense that they would not play a strictly dominated strategy, -they can communicate atomic information about their preferences within any group they belong to, -once a message is communicated, it is commonly known within the group, -communication is truthful and synchronous, -the players have no knowledge other than what follows from these assumptions, -the above assumptions are common knowledge.
In our communication setting, intuitively, information can be either unknown to some player or commonly known in a group. Acting on partial information thus necessitates to figure out precisely which information is commonly known in a group. Note that in this context strategic (i.e., possibly untruthful) communication conveys no conclusive information. Consequently, study of epistemic consequences of such communication requires additional assumptions, like probability distributions over statements and meanings, and can be carried out only after the setting with truthful communication has been investigated. We therefore focus on truthful communication and return briefly to this matter in Sect. 5 .
The following example illustrates the general procedure that we examine. B Note that the payoffs of players 1 and 2 do not depend on the strategy on player 3 and the payoff of player 3 depends only on the strategy of player 2. This game can easily be solved by IESDS, yielding the profile (D, R, A). However, assuming that each player is ignorant about the other players' preferences, the initial situation looks as follows from the perspective of players 1, 2, and 3, respectively: 
B
Given player 1's rationality, he will not play U , as it is strictly dominated by D. However, in the current situation, neither of the other two players can exclude player 1's playing U , given the information at their disposal.
Assume now that player 1 communicates his preferences to player 2, thus creating common knowledge about them (among himself and player 2). Player 2's picture then looks as follows:
B Player 2, knowing that player 1 is rational, can conclude that player 1 will not play U . Consequently player 2 can remove his own strategy L from consideration, since with player 1 playing D, L is dominated by R. If player 2 now communicates his preferences both to players 1 and 3, then player 1 will be able to conclude that player 2 will not play L; however, player 3 will not be able to conclude this, since he lacks the information that player 2 knows that player 1 will not play U . Given that communication is only about players' own preferences, and given that in this example we only allowed pairwise communication, player 3 will not be able to deduce that player 2 will play R, and consequently will not be able to eliminate his strategy B.
In this paper, we look at settings of restricted communications like in this example, and characterize exactly what strategies can be safely eliminated at different stages of communication.
Results
We study the outcome of IESDS in the above setting in any state of partial communication (i.e., where some messages about players' preferences have been sent), and in particular in the state of full communication, where all communication permitted by the interaction structure has taken place. In terms of distributed decision making, local information consists of players' preferences and new information consists of information about other players' preferences obtained through the received messages. In turn, deduction consists of the elimination of strategies, and the conclusion is the outcome of IESDS.
We use the results from our previous work [3] to prove that this outcome realizes an epistemic formula that describes what the players know in the considered partial communication state.
Background and related work
Our epistemic analysis belongs to a large body of research within game theory concerned with the study of players' knowledge and beliefs, see, e.g. [7] . In particular, Brandenburger and Dekel [9] and Tan and Werlang [27] have shown that if the payoff functions are commonly known and the players are rational and have common knowledge of each other's rationality, they will only play strategies that survive IESDS, where one uses strict dominance by a mixed strategy.
When one restricts one's attention to pure strategies, then, as shown in [4] , the above implication holds for arbitary games. It is also clarified there that the corresponding implication does not hold for weak dominance, even for finite two-player games.
The mathematical reason is that the global version of strict dominance, sd g , that we introduce in Sect. 4.2 is monotonic, while the global version of weak dominance is not. Now, our approach crucially depends on the monotonicity of sd g , which explains why the results of our paper do not carry over to weak dominance.
The concept of IESDS is closely related to that of rationalizability of [8, 23] that focuses on the strategies that survive iterated elimination of never best responses. In fact, (see, e.g. [21, Proposition 61.2] ) the concepts of a strict dominance by a mixed strategy and of a never best response to a correlated strategy coincide. However, we use here only pure strategies, and consequently in our setup these concepts differ.
Further, as shown in [28] , for finite games the outcome of IESDS can be characterized using the concept of a public announcement due to [24] . In [5] we generalized this characterization to infinite games and clarified that it holds for monotonic dominance notions, including the global version of strict dominance, but excluding the customary strict dominance.
Our framework stresses the locality of information about preferences in combination with communication and consequently leads to a different epistemic analysis. In particular, in our setting the analysis of players' knowledge requires taking into account players' reasoning about group communication.
It is useful to clarify the difference between our framework and graphical games of [20] . In these games a locality assumption is formalized by assuming a graph structure over the set of players and using payoff functions which depend only on the strategies of players' neighbors. The absence of communication precludes a distributed view of IESDS.
Plan of the paper
In Sect. 2, we review the basic notions concerning normal-form games, strict dominance and operators on the restrictions of games. Next, in Sect. 3, we study the outcome of IESDS in the presence of an interaction structure. We first look at the outcome resulting after all communication permitted in the given interaction structure has taken place, and then consider the outcome obtained in an arbitrary state of partial communication.
The connection with knowledge is made in Sect. 4, where we provide in this setting the epistemic characterization of IESDS. Finally, in Sect. 5, we suggest some future research directions.
In the Appendix we provide the omitted proofs. An initial, short version of this paper appeared as [30] .
Preliminaries
Following [22] , a normal-form game (in short, game) for players N = {1, . . . , n} (with
-S i is the non-empty, finite set of strategies available to player i. We write S to abbreviate the set of strategy profiles:
i is the preference relation (i.e., a complete transitive reflexive binary relation) for player i, so i ⊆ S × S.
Since we are considering strict dominance, we will use from now on only the strict counterparts of the preference relations, denoted by i . In this qualitative approach one cannot introduce mixed strategies. However, they are not used in our approach. The extension of our results to the iterated elimination of strict dominance by a mixed strategy is not obvious. The reason is that in the proofs we crucially rely on the fact that one can form a finite disjunction over the set of strictly dominating strategies. In specific examples we shall use the customary payoff functions.
As usual we denote player i's strategy in a strategy profile s ∈ S by s i , and the tuple consisting of all other strategies by s −i , i.e., 
In the subsequent considerations each considered game is identified with the set of statements of the form s i s −i s i , where i ∈ N , s i , s i ∈ S i , and s −i ∈ S −i and both strict dominance notions are formulated in terms of such statements. Therefore the results of this paper apply equally well to the strategic games with parametrized preferences introduced in [2] . In these games instead of the preferences relations 1 , . . . , n , for each joint strategy s −i of the opponents of player i a strict preference relation s −i over the strategies of player i is given. So in strategic games with parametrized preferences players cannot compare two arbitrary strategy profiles.
Fix now an initial game G := (S 1 , . . . , S n , 1 , . . . , n ). We say that the tuple (S 1 , . . . , S n ) is a restriction of G if each S i is a subset of S i . We identify the restriction (S 1 , . . . , S n ) with G.
The restrictions of G are ordered by the component-wise set inclusion:
To analyze iterated elimination of strategies from the initial game G, we view such procedures as operators on the finite lattice formed by the set of restrictions of G ordered by the above inclusion relation.
For 
That is, sd(s i , G ) holds iff strategy s i of player i survives elimination of strictly dominated strategies with respect to S i , i.e., iff it is not strictly dominated on S −i by any strategy from S i .
Given an operator T on a finite lattice (D, ⊆) with the largest element , X ∈ D, and k ≥ 0, we denote by T k (X ) the k-fold iteration of T starting at X , so with T 0 (X ) = X , and put T ∞ (X ) := k≥0 T k (X ), where is the meet operation entailed by ⊆. We abbreviate
Finally, as in [3] , an interaction structure H is a hypergraph on N , i.e., a set of non-empty subsets of N , called hyperarcs.
Iterated strategy elimination
In this section we define procedures for IESDS. Let us fix a game G = (S 1 , . . . , S n , 1 , . . . , n ) for players N and an interaction structure H ⊆ 2 N \{∅}. In Sect. 3.1, we look at the outcome reached after all communication permitted by H has taken place, that is, when within each hyperarc of H all of its members' preferences have been communicated. In Sect. 3.2, we then look at the outcomes obtained in any particular state of partial communication.
The formulations we give here make no direct use of a formal notion of knowledge. The connection with a formal epistemic model is made in Sect. 4. All iterations of the considered operators start at the initial restriction (S 1 , . . . , S n ).
Full communication
Let us assume that within each hyperarc A ∈ H , all players in A have shared all information about their preferences. We leave the precise definition of communication to Sect. 3.2.
For each group of players A ⊆ N , let S A denote the set of those restrictions of G which only restrict the strategy sets of players from A. That is,
We now define a contracting operator T A on the set S A as follows. We call T ∞ A the outcome of IESDS on A. We then define the restriction
That is, the ith component of G(H ) is the ith component of the result of applying T {i} to the intersection of T ∞ A for all A ∈ H containing i. We call G(H ) the outcome of IESDS with respect to H . Note that T is contracting.
Let us "walk through" this definition to understand it better. Given a player i and a hy-
A is the outcome of IESDS on A, starting at (S 1 , . . . , S n ). The strategies of players from outside of A are not affected by this process. This elimination process is performed simultaneously for each hyperarc that i is a member of. By intersecting the outcomes, i.e., by considering the restriction A:i∈A∈H T ∞ A , one arrives at a restriction in which all such "groupwise" iterated eliminations have taken place. However, in this restriction some of the strategies of player i may not survive elimination. They are eliminated using one application of the T {i} operator. We illustrate this process, and in particular this last step, in the following example.
Example 2 Consider the following three-player game G where player 3 chooses between the left (A) and the right (B) table.
So, for example, the payoffs for the strategy profile (U, L , B) are, respectively, 0, 1, and 0. Now assume the interaction structure H = {{1, 2}, {1, 3}}. We obtain the outcomes T ∞ {1,2} = ({U, D}, {L}, {A, B}) and T ∞ {1,3} = ({U, D}, {L , R}, {A}). The restriction defined by these two outcomes is ({U, D}, {L}, {A}), and in the final step player 1 eliminates his strategy D by one application of T {1} . The outcome of the whole process is thus G(H ) = ({U }, {L}, {A}). See Fig. 1 for an illustration of this situation.
In this example, the outcome with respect to the given interaction structure coincides with the outcome of the customary IESDS applied to the initial game. However, this is not the case in general, and the purpose of this example is simply to illustrate how the operators work. Example 3 later on shows in a different setting how the interaction structure can affect the outcome.
Note that when H consists of the single hyperarc N that contains all the players, then for each player i, A:i∈A∈H T ∞ A reduces to T ∞ N , and this is closed under application of each operator
coincides then with the customary outcome of iterated elimination strictly dominated strategies.
In general, this customary outcome is included in the outcome w.r.t. any hypergraph H , as the following result shows.
Theorem 1 For any game G and hypergraph H we have T ∞ N ⊆ G(H ).
Noting that T ∞ N = G({N }), this can be interpreted as a special case of a monotonicity property: If H is a refinement of H , then H allows more communication to take place, and thus more strategies to be eliminated, than H . In symbols, G(H ) ⊆ G(H ). Since we are not going to use this property, we restrict ourselves to the simpler version as stated.
The inclusion proved in this result cannot be reversed, even when each pair of players shares a hyperarc. The following example also shows that the hypergraph structure is more informative than the corresponding graph structure.
Example 3 Consider the following game with three players, where player 3 chooses between the left (A) and the right (B) table.
Note that the payoffs of player 1 and 2 depend only on each other's choices, and the payoff of player 3 depends only on the choices of player 2 and 3.
If we assume the hypergraph H that consists of the single hyperarc {1, 2, 3}, then the outcome of IESDS w.r.t. H is the customary outcome which equals ({D}, {R}, {A}). Indeed, player 1 can eliminate his strictly dominated strategy U , then player 2 can eliminate L, and subsequently player 3 can eliminate B.
In contrast, if the hypergraph consists of all pairs of players, that is, H = {{1, 2}, {2, 3}, {1, 3}}, then the outcome of IESDS w.r.t. H equals ({D}, {R}, {A, B}).
Indeed, in order for 3 to be able to eliminate B, he would have to know that 2 has eliminated L. However, the second hypergraph H = {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}} does not allow this: although 2 and 3 can both learn that 1 eliminates U , they learn it together. So in particular the information that 2 knows that 1 eliminates U is not available to 3, who thus does not learn that she eliminates L.
More formally, the result can be calculated as follows:
= {R}, and
Partial communication
The We now adjust the definition of strict dominance to account for partial states, such that in a partial state given by M it uses only information shared among a given group A. So with singleton A = {i} only i's preferences are used, and with larger A only preferences contained in messages to a superset of A are used: 
. We now define a generalization of the T A operator by:
where G = (S 1 , . . . , S n ) and for all i ∈ N ,
Note that, as before, S i remains unchanged for i ∈ A, since then sd A,M (s i , G ) always holds. Indeed, for it to be false, there would have to be some message (i, A, ·) ∈ M, which would imply i ∈ A.
Similarly, we now define the outcome of IESDS with respect to H, M to be the restriction Here H denotes the closure of H under non-empty intersection. That is,
The use of H is necessary because certain information may be entailed by messages sent to different hyperarcs. For example, with ( j, A, s j s − j s j ), ( j, A , s j s − j s j ) ∈ M, the combined information that s j s − j s j is available to the members of A ∩ A .
Again, let us "walk through" the definition of G(H, M). First, a separate elimination process is run on each hyperarc of H , using only information which has been communicated there (which now no longer covers all members' preferences, but only the ones according to the partial state M). Then, in the final step, each player combines his insights from all hyperarcs of which he is a member, and eliminates any strategies that he thereby learns not to be optimal. Note that the underlying hypergraph H can be "recovered" from the set of messages M used, that is, we could define H := {A | (., A, .) ∈ M}. However, explicit use of the hypergraph allows us to compare the setting with partial information with that of full information. Namely, it is easy to see that in the case where the players have communicated all there is to communicate, i.e., for
the partial outcome coincides with the previously defined outcome, i.e.,
This corresponds to the intuition that G(H ) captures the elimination process when all possible communication has taken place. In particular, all entailed information has also been communicated in M all H , which is why we did not need to consider H in Sect. 3.1. The effect of full communication within a hyperarc A is that the players in A acquire common knowledge of the set T ∞ A . However, to compute the final outcome of the elimination process, that is G(H ), each player combines this information across all hyperarcs he is a member of. Consequently, the players do not have common knowledge of G(H ). This point is illustrated in the following example.
Example 4
The process described in this example is illustrated in Fig. 2 . Consider again the game G from Example 2, and the initial state where M = ∅. We have T ∞ A,M = G for all A ∈ H , that is, without communication no strategy can "commonly" be eliminated. However, players 2 and 3 can "privately" eliminate one of their strategies each, since each of them knows his own preferences, so
This elimination cannot be iterated further by other players and the overall outcome is Example 5 We look at a game involving four players, but we are only interested in the preferences of two of them. The other two players serve merely to create different hyperarcs. The strategies and payoffs of player 1 and 2 are as follows:
For players 3 and 4 we assume a "dummy" strategy, denoted respectively by X and Y . Consider the hypergraph H = {{1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 4}} and the partial state
The fact that player 1, independently of what the remaining players do, strictly prefers A over C is not explicit in these pieces of information, but it is entailed by them, since A L XY B Player 2 can make use of this fact that C is dominated, and eliminate his own strategy L. If we now look at a state in which player 2 has communicated his relevant preferences, so M = M ∪ {(2, {1, 2, 3}, R α XY L) | α ∈ {A, B, D}}, we notice that player 1 can in turn eliminate A and B, but only by combining information available to the players in {1, 2, 3} ∩ {1, 2, 4}. There is no single hyperarc in the original hypergraph which has all the required information available. It thus becomes clear that we need to take into account iterated elimination on intersections of hyperarcs.
The whole process is illustrated in Fig. 3 .
Epistemic foundations
In this section, we provide epistemic foundations for our framework. The aim is to prove that the definition of the outcome G(H, M) correctly captures what strategies the players can eliminate using all they "know", in a formal sense.
We proceed as follows. First, in Sect. 4.1, we briefly introduce an epistemic model formalizing the players' knowledge. We apply the basic framework and results from [3] . In Sect. 4.2, we give a general epistemic formulation of strict dominance and argue that it correctly captures the notion. Section 4.2 also contains the main result of our epistemic analysis, namely that the outcome G(H, M) indeed yields the outcome stipulated by the epistemic formulation.
Epistemic language and states
Again, we assume a fixed game G with non-empty set of strategies S i for each player i, and a hypergraph H representing the interaction structure. Analogously to [3] , we use a propositional epistemic language with a set At of atoms which is divided into disjoint subsets At i , one for each player i, where
The set At i describes all possible strict preferences between pairs of strategies of player i, relative to a joint strategy of the opponents. A valuation V is a subset of the atoms At such that for each s −i ∈ S −i , the restriction V ∩ {· s −i ·} is a strict partial order. 2 Intuitively, a valuation consists of exactly the atoms assumed true. Each specific game G induces exactly one valuation which simply represents its preferences. However, in general we also need to model the fact that players may not have full knowledge of the game. The restriction imposed on the valuations ensures that each of them is induced by some game.
So for example {s a t} is a valuation (given a game with appropriate strategy sets), while {s a t, t a u} and {s a t, t a s} are not (the former failing to make s a u true).
Recall from Sect. 3.2 that a message from player i to a hyperarc A ∈ H has the form (i, A, s i s −i s i ), where i ∈ A, s i , s i ∈ S i , and s −i ∈ S −i . We say that a message (·, ·, p) is truthful with respect to a valuation V if p ∈ V . A state, or possible world, is a pair (V, M) , where V is a valuation and M is a set of messages that are truthful with respect to V .
For a set of messages M, A ⊆ N , and p ∈ At, M A p is defined as in Sect. 3.2. That is, M A p means that p is entailed by the messages in M received by A, for example, by transitivity of the represented preference order.
In [3] , we defined set operations to act component-wise on states, e.g.
However, the results we consider also hold with a modified inclusion relation, where
is the set of messages that player i received.
We now define an indistinguishability relation between states:
For A ⊆ N the relation ∼ A is the transitive closure of i∈A ∼ i . We consider the following positive epistemic language L + :
where the atoms p denote the facts in At, while ∧ and ∨ are the standard connectives 3 ; and C A is a knowledge operator, with C A ϕ meaning ϕ is common knowledge among A. The intuition for C A is that everybody in A knows ϕ, everybody knows that everybody knows ϕ, etc. We write K i for C {i} ; K i ϕ can be read 'i knows that ϕ'. For a sequence of players
Note that this language does not contain negation, which is not needed in our presentation. We assume that each player i initially knows the true facts in At i entailed by the initial game G and that the basic assumptions from Sect. 1.1 are commonly known among the players. The formal semantics is defined as follows (recall that each message in M is truthful with respect to V ):
Now we are ready to state the following results from [3] , slightly adapted to fit our notation. 
Lemma 1 (from [3, Lemma 3.2]) For any ϕ ∈ L + and states (V, M) and (V , M ) with
This theorem states that in this setting, knowledge distributes over disjunction, when the formulas in question are positive. That might seem surprising, and so it is worth emphasizing that the result does depend on the positivity of the formulas (ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 ∈ L + ), and also on the assumptions about communication, and therefore possible configurations of knowledge, that are inherent in our setup. 
Correctness result
We use results from [3] , summed up in Sect. 4.1, in order to prove that the T G operator defined in Sect. 3 is correct with respect to an epistemic formulation of our setting.
In order to simplify our presentation, we use a global version of strict dominance (introduced by [13] ) instead of sd. We use
The difference is that sd g considers dominance by a strategy from the original set S i , while sd considers dominance only by strategies from the set S i that has survived elimination in the subgame G . So in sd g , it is stipulated that a strategy is not strictly dominated by a strategy from the initial game. As noted in [1, 10] , sd g is monotonic, while sd is not. In order to use sd g instead of sd, we need to show that our definitions and results do not depend on the choice of strict dominance relation.
We first relate the global and the local version of strict dominance, slightly overloading notation by letting sd(G ) = ({s i ∈ S i | sd(s i , G )}) i∈N , and similarly for sd g . The two notions are equivalent in the following sense.
Lemma 3 Let
G 0 , G 1 , . .
. be a sequence of restrictions of the initial restriction
Intuitively, this claim can be stated as follows. Suppose that each restriction G k+1 is obtained from G k by removing some strategies that are strictly dominated in the global sense. Then the local and global strict dominance coincide on each considered restriction G k . As a consequence, the result also holds if the strategies removed are required to be strictly dominated in the local instead of the global sense.
Next, we show that the operators we defined in Sect. 3 produce sequences that satisfy the conditions of Lemma 3, and thus coincide for the global and the local version of strict dominance.
Lemma 4 For any hypergraph H and set of messages M, the outcome G(H, M) does not depend on the choice of sd or sd g .
We now start the main task of this section by giving a formula describing the global version of IESDS in the customary games. We define, for i ∈ N and s i ∈ S i ,
The following simple result relates this formula to the T N operator (that is, T G where G is the group of all players), where we assume sd g as the optimality notion.
Proposition 1 For any game
G, ≥ 1, and i ∈ N (T N ) i = s i | domin (s i ) does not hold . Consequently (T ∞ N ) i = s i | domin ∞ (s i ) does not hold .
(The propositional formulas here are evaluated with respect to the valuation induced by G.)
We now modify the above formula to an epistemic formula describing the IESDS (in the sense of sd g ) in games with interaction structures. In contrast to the above formulation the formula below states that player i knows that a strategy is strictly dominated.
We define, for i ∈ N and s i ∈ S i ,
Note that s j refers to j's component of s −i . Note also that dom 1 (s i ) = K i domin 1 (s i ) and that dom +1 (s i ) is defined in terms of dom (s i ) and not domin (s i ).
So, in the base case, player i knows that s i is strictly dominated if i knows that there is an alternative strategy s i which, for all joint strategies of the other players, is strictly preferred. Furthermore, after iteration + 1, i knows that s i is strictly dominated if i knows that there is an alternative strategy s i such that, for all joint strategies s −i of the other players, either s i is strictly preferred or some strategy s j in s −i is already known by player j to be strictly dominated after iteration .
Note that for > 1 each dom (s i ) is a formula of L + that contains occurrences of all K j operators. We restrict our attention to formulas dom (s i ) with ∈ {1, . . . ,ˆ }, whereˆ = i∈N |S i |. By their semantics there is some within this range such that for all ≥ , dom is equivalent to dom . To reflect the fact that this can be seen as the outcome of the iteration, we denote domˆ by dom ∞ .
We now proceed to the main result of the paper. We prove that the non-epistemic formulation of IESDS, as defined in Sect. 3, coincides with the epistemic formulation of strict dominance. As mentioned at the beginning of this section, we can assume that G (H, M) is defined using the global version of strict dominance, sd g .
Theorem 4 For any game G, hypergraph H , set of messages M truthful with respect to G, and i ∈ N ,
where V is the valuation induced by G.
Note that, as described in Subsect. 1.1, we assume common knowledge of rationality. Which strategies can be (iteratively) eliminated thus depends only on the agents' knowledge. The eliminations that can be performed in the epistemic situation arising from a given state of communication are captured by the right-hand side of the equation above.
Recall that the definition of the dom ∞ relation involves knowledge operators K i . However, it does not rely on the common knowledge operators C A . In the course of the proof of the above theorem (in Lemma 7) we show that common knowledge is in fact implicitly present here. The technical explanation for this fact is that in the definition of dom ∞ the operators K i are nested and that in our context these operators distribute both over conjunction and disjunction (Theorem 2).
Concluding remarks
We studied normal-form games in the presence of interaction structures. We assumed that initially the players know only their own preferences, and that they can truthfully communicate information about their own preferences within their parts of the interaction structure. This allowed us to analyze the consequences of locality, formalized by means of an interaction structure, on the outcome of the IESDS. To this end we appropriately adapted the framework introduced in [3] and showed that in any given state of communication this outcome can be described by means of epistemic analysis.
Possible extensions
It would be interesting to extend the analysis here presented in a number of ways, by:
-allowing players to send information about the preferences of other players that they learned through interaction, -allowing other forms of messages, for example, messages containing information that a strategy has been eliminated, or containing epistemic statements, such as knowing that some strategy of another player has been eliminated, -considering formation or evolution of interaction structures, given strategic advantages of certain interaction structures over others, -(suggested by one of the referees) considering a set up in which each admitted group of agents uses a correlation device to synchronize their actions, -considering strategic aspects of communication, even if truthfulness is required (should one send some piece of information or not?).
The last point is discussed further in the subsection below. We are currently working on a distributed implementation of the aspects presented in this paper, which we plan to extend and evaluate in a separate work. A preliminary description is contained in [29] . The objective is to present it in a form of an agent-oriented program as suggested by [26] , where the agents' motivational attitudes are based on their payoffs.
Finally, let us mention that in [3] we studied an abstract (so non-game theoretic) setting in which players send messages that inform a group about some atomic fact that a player knows or has learned. We clarified there, among other things, under what conditions common knowledge of the underlying hypergraph matters. The framework there considered could be generalized by allowing players to jointly arrive at some conclusions using their background theories, by interaction through messages sent to groups. From this perspective the form of IESDS studied here could be seen as an instance of such a conclusion. Because of the form of allowed messages and background knowledge, this study would differ from the line of research pursued by [16] , where the effects of communication are considered in the framework of distributed systems.
Strategic communication
Among the topics for future research especially incorporation of strategic communication into our framework is an interesting challenge. Note that we do not examine here strategic or normative aspects of the communication. In fact, we do not allow players to lie and do not even examine why they communicate or what they should truthfully communicate to maximize their utilities. Rather, we examine what happens if they do communicate, assuming that they are truthful, rational and have reasoning powers.
To justify this focus, it is helpful to realize that in some settings strategic aspects of communication are not relevant. One possibility is when communication is not a deliberate act, but rather occurs through observation of somebody's behavior. Such communication is certainly more difficult to manipulate and more laborious to fake than mere words. In a sense it is inherently credible, and research in social learning argues along similar lines [11, Ch. 3] .
In the setting of artificial agents communicating by messages, to view communication as something non-deliberate is more problematic. Here, ignoring strategic aspects of communication can be interpreted as bounds on the players' rationality or reasoning capabilities-they simply lack the capabilities to deal with all the consequences of such an inherently rich phenomenon as communication.
In general, strategic communication is a research topic on its own, with controversial discussions (see, e.g., [25] ) and many questions open. Crawford and Sobel [14] have considered the topic in a probabilistic setting, and Farrell and Rabin [17] have looked at related issues under the notion of cheap talk. Within epistemic logic, formalizations of the information content of strategic communication have been suggested, e.g., by [19] .
Dynamics of group communication
Furthermore, the subject of group communication has other connections to epistemic logic: the changes in knowledge that are brought about by various kinds of actions, including some forms of communication, have been extensively examined in so-called dynamic epistemic logic. Baltag and Moss [6] is an important early paper in this field, introducing an operation on epistemic models that allows for the rigorous analysis of a very broad class of epistemic events. That class includes the announcements to subgroups that we in effect consider here. Baltag and Moss [6] study logics in which there are, in addition to modal operators for knowledge and common knowledge, operators [a]ϕ, meaning that after action a, ϕ holds. Our interest here is not directly related to these concerns. We do not have (or need) a logic for describing states, and we consider a specific communication protocol that is formalized by our notion of interaction structure. We use this to induce a solution concept, whose epistemic foundation we then study. On the other hand a dynamic epistemic logic might be helpful to describe precisely the dynamics of the strategy elimination process, a topic that we do not consider here.
A Omitted proofs
Proof (Theorem 1) We first prove the corresponding claim for the global version of strict dominance, sd g , introduced before Lemma 3.
Consider A ⊆ A ⊆ N . By definition, this implies that for all restrictions G we have
Since sd g is monotonic, so is the operator T C for all C ⊆ N . Hence by a straightforward induction T ∞ N ⊆ T ∞ A for all A ⊆ N , and consequently, for all players i, T
Hence, for all i ∈ N ,
, where the inclusion holds by the monotonicity of T {i} . Consequently T ∞ N ⊆ G(H ). We now prove the original claim for the local version of strict dominance. We need to distinguish the T C operator for sd and sd g . In the former case we write T C,l and in the latter case T C,g . The reason that we use the latter operators is that they are monotonic and closely related to the former operators. As a consequence of Lemma 3,
and by (1) for
Further, we have
Hence, by (2) and monotonicity of T {i},g ,
Also, for all i ∈ N and all restrictions G we have, by definition,
so by the last inclusion
Proof (Lemma 3)
We show that for all k ≥ 0 each globally (strictly) dominated strategy is also locally dominated in G k . Together with the straightforward fact that local dominance implies global dominance, this proves the desired equivalence.
Formally, the claim is thus that for all k ≥ 0, s i ∈ S i and
To show this we prove by induction that for all k ≥ 0 and s i , which concludes the proof of the induction step.
In order to prove Lemma 4, we need an auxiliary lemma dealing with operators in a general setting. Given Y ∈ D and an operator T on a finite lattice (D, ⊆), we denote by T Y the following operator:
Note 1 If the T operator is contracting, then so is T Y .
Lemma 5 Suppose that T and U are operators on a finite lattice (D, ⊆) such that T is monotonic and contracting. Then T
Informally, this claim states that the combined effect of independent limit iterations of T and U can be modelled by 'serial' limit iterations of T and U , provided the operator T is modified to an appropriate T Y form.
Proof Denote for brevity T ∞ ∩ U ∞ by Y . First we prove by induction that for all k ≥ 0
The claim clearly holds for k = 0. Suppose it holds for some k ≥ 0. Then by the induction hypothesis
To prove the converse implication we show by induction that for all k ≥ 0
The claim clearly holds for k = 0. Suppose it holds for some k ≥ 0. Then by the induction hypothesis and the monotonicity of T
Next, by Note 1 the operator T Y is contracting, so
Now the claim follows by (3), (4) and (5).
Proof (Lemma 4)
Recall that H denotes the closure of H under non-empty intersection. Fix an interaction structure H , a set of messages M and i ∈ N . Assume for simplicity that the set {A | i ∈ A ∈ H } has exactly two elements, say, B i and C i . To deal with the arbitrary situation Lemma 5 needs to be generalized to an arbitrary number of operators. Such a generalization is straightforward and omitted. Let now This concludes the proof.
In order to prove Theorem 4, we need some preparatory steps. To see that the downwards implication of the last step holds, note that dom (s j ) = K j ϕ for appropriate ϕ. With Theorem 3, K i K j ϕ implies C {i, j} ϕ. With an induction starting from Lemma 2 and using Theorem 2, this implies that there must be messages in M jointly observed by i and j that entail ϕ. Each of these messages must have been sent to some A ∈ H , and so all messages have been observed by some A ∈ H with i, j ∈ A.
Lemma 7 For any ≥ 1, i ∈ A ∈ H , s i ∈ S i , and state (V, M), s i ∈ T A,M i iff (V, M) C A dom (s i ).
Proof By induction on . The base case follows straightforwardly from the definitions. Now assume the claim holds for . Then, focusing on the interesting case where A = {i}, we have the following chain of equivalences: We are now ready to prove the main result.
Proof (Theorem 4) Let
S := A:i∈A∈H T ∞ A,M . We have: 
